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NICHOLAS KREMMYDAS*

The Cross-Conditionality
Phenomenon-Some Legal Aspects
Under article X of its Articles of Agreement the International Monetary Fund
has the authority to "cooperate within the terms of its Articles with any general
international organization and with public international organizations having
specialized responsibilities in related fields." In accordance with this provision,
the Fund has been cooperating with a number of international organizations,
including the World Bank and the regional Development Banks. '
Historically the Fund has a particularly close relationship with the World
Bank, and cooperation between the Fund and the Bank has intensified in recent
years. Recently the Fund and the Bank have developed mechanisms of
collaboration between their staffs to assist low income countries to develop a
medium-term economic framework. 2 Whether we are witnessing a crossconditionality phenomenon in this cooperation is the subject matter of this
article. 3
Fifteen years ago, the division of labor between the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund seemed straightforward. The Fund was responsible for short-term stabilization that concentrated on monetary variables and
demand management, while the Bank was responsible for longer-term
perspectives, and was oriented towards increasing supply-side efficiency and
stimulating productive investment. While there was always some interdependence among these areas-the Fund's interest in providing immediate
balance of payments financial assistance, and the Bank's interest in providing
*Athens, Greece.
1. A description of the type of cooperation entertained by the Fund with other international
organizations appears in the Annual Reports of the Fund.
2. Programs formulated within this framework are supported by loans from the Fund and the
Bank.
3. See also art. X [Articles of Agreement], which reads as follows: "The Fund shall cooperate
within the terms of this Agreement with any general international organization and with public
international organizations having specialized responsibilities in related fields ..
"
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lending for discrete projects-their respective staffs achieved their targets with
only occasional interaction.
Enhanced collaboration is clearly justified in the two institutions' Articles of
Agreement. Cooperation with other international organizations is provided for
in article X of the Fund's Articles of Agreement and in article V, section 8(a) of
the World Bank's articles. Cooperation is envisaged both with "any general
international organization" and with "public international organizations having
specialized responsibilities in related fields." In the case of the Bank there is an
additional provision that has no counterpart in the IMF articles. Paragraph 8(b)
of the World Bank's articles provides that "in making decisions on applications
for loans or guarantees relating to matters directly within the competence of any
international organization of the types specified in the preceding paragraph and
participated in primarily by members of the Bank, the Bank shall give consideration to the views and recommendations of such organizations."
Two points must be taken into consideration here. The first is that while the
World Bank is clearly required to "give consideration to the views and
recommendations of the IMF," there is no comparable obligation on the IMF
under its articles. The second is that the Bank is not required, under article V,
section 8(b), to do more than "give consideration" to the views and recommendations of the IMF. The Bank is certainly not bound by anything the Fund may
say or do.4
I. The Issue
The meaning of the word "conditionality" in the context of the IMF and,
more recently, the World Bank, is well known to those working in these two
institutions. Gold states that the word "conditionality" in the International
Monetary Fund refers to the policies the Fund expects a member to follow in
order to be entitled to the use of its resources. 5 A similar interpretation could
trace the essence of the World Bank's conditionality to policy-based operations.
It appears that a formal definition of cross-conditionality has not yet been
established. Sidney Dell, acknowledging this fact, has suggested the following
four examples of "official" cross-conditionality. 6 He states that formal crossconditionality arises or might arise:
(i) If either of the Bretton Woods institutions exercised, or sought to exercise, a veto
over a loan under consideration by the other or over a drawing against an existing loan;
(ii) if there were a formal understanding between the two institutions that neither
would make a loan to or an arrangement (the term "arrangement" here refers to an IMF
stand-by arrangement) with any member country, or with a particular member country,
except with the concurrence of the other institution;

4. Id.
5. J. GOLD, CONDrnONALrrY 1 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 31, 1979).
6. S. Dell, The Question of Cross-Conditionality 6 (June 1986) (unpublished paper).
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(iii) if there were a formal understanding between the two institutions that neither
would allow member countries, or a particular member country, continued access to a
previously agreed loan or arrangement, except with the concurrence of the other
institution;
(iv) if a formal action, notably a declaration of ineligibility by the Fund were, by
previous arrangement between the two institutions, to interrupt access to a Bank loan.
Informal cross-conditionality could thus be considered in terms of circumstances in which, although there was no formal arrangement or understanding
between the two institutions, the same outcome occurred through the actions
and
7
decisions of each organization acting individually and independently.
The most common example of collaboration that cannot be considered as
cross-conditionality stricto sensu, is the close interrelatedness between the World
Bank and the Fund as far as consultative procedures towards final decision making is concerned. This type of informal cooperation could be contemplated as
indirect informal consultative cross-conditionality. 8 In this case the behavior of
both international institutions cannot be regarded as being inconsistent with their
Articles of Agreement.
Another example of collaboration that falls into the sphere of informal indirect
cross-conditionality is the attempt of both institutions to provide a similar
package of conditionality, in other words, a kind of uniformity of advice to the
country seeking financial assistance. This could be termed as interdependent
indirect informal economic cross-conditionality.
The third type of informal indirect cross-conditionality could be termed
"informal indirect financial cross-conditionality." This type of informal crossconditionality can be understood not as the relationship involving the two
international financial institutions but as a relationship in a wider area, including
the commercial banks, regional development banks, and other bilateral and
multilateral, official and private lenders. In other words, it could be interpreted
as involving the spectrum of the World Bank Structural Adjustment Loans, the
rescheduling of official bilateral loans through the Paris Club, the rescheduling
and new loans from the private banking system, and IMF stand-by or extended
arrangements.
Indirect informal financial cross-conditionality is the most important type of
informal cross-conditionality. Indirect informal financial cross-conditionality
raises the issue of the "multiplier" effect that a denial of either a Structural
Adjustment Loan from the Bank, or a stand-by or similar arrangement from the
Fund, could have on the decisions of other lenders. It demonstrates the catalytic
effect these agencies have assumed in influencing flows from commercial banks,
export credit agencies, and bilateral donors to countries that undertake adjustment programs.
7. See Feinberg, The Changing Relationship Between the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, 42 INr'L ORG. 545-60 (1988).
8. Id.
FALL 1989
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Take, for instance, the case where commercial bank loans are conditioned on
the borrower's ability to draw under a stand-by or similar arrangement from the
Fund. If the Fund declares that the member is not in compliance with its
instructions, then banks may withdraw their lending operations from the
country. The loss of important commercial bank credits could undermine the
borrower's creditworthiness, and subsequently destroy or at least diminish its
capacity to proceed with an application for a policy-based World Bank loan. Or
take the case where the commercial banks enter into parallel or co-financing
arrangements, and condition their loans on the World Bank's approval of a
sector loan. A negative answer from-the World Bank could affect the decision
of commercial banks to proceed with their credits and, subsequently, could
affect the borrower's standing before international financial markets. It could
affect also the member's credit policies and exchange reserves, and ultimately
could influence negatively
the Fund's willingness to continue to support the
9
member's program.
In practice formal cross-conditionality has been very rarely applied. As far as
this author knows, only one case l ° involving explicit cross-conditionality has
ever come before either of the Executive Boards. Nevertheless, implicit crossconditionality is a real problem. Loans conditioned by both Bretton Woods
institutions are not presented to the respective Executive Boards for consideration or decision until compliance with the requisite cross-conditional clauses has
been secured. The Executive Boards are thus not made officially aware of the
existence of any cross-conditions. Cross-conditionality, consequently, does not
manifest itself in any overt way.
II. Legal Issues Arising from "Informal"
Cross-Conditionality-Ultra Vires
In practice, cross-conditionality could be construed as the phenomenon
whereby acceptance by the borrowing country of the conditions of one financial
agency is made a precondition for financial support by the others. These are
recognized but unwritten conventions, such as the requirement that a country
applying for a World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan has previously undertaken an IMF program. The legal issues arising from these unwritten conventions
constitute the subject matter of this section.

9. See A. F. Mohammed, The Role of the Fund and the World Bank in Adjustment and
Development, in ADJUSTMENT POLICIES AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IN THE ARAB WORLD 84-85
(S. EI-Naggar ed.).
10. The loan agreement of the World Bank with Jamaica, approved December 13, 1977,
included a specific provision tying the World Bank's disbursements to the ability of Jamaica to
purchase stated amounts under stand-by arrangements with the IMF. Loan Agreement (Program
Loan) between Jamaica and the IBRD, Loan No. 1500 JM, Dec. 16, 1977 (Schedule 1 para. 2(b),

(c)).
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1

CASES OF CROSS-CONDITONALITY 1

Because of the circumstances in which cross-conditionality is believed to
occur, and the fact that generally no objective evidence can be provided of its
occurrence, it is not possible to document specific cases. For this reason, the
cases that are set out below are given in hypothetical terms.
Case 1
Country A makes a successful approach to the IMF for the establishment of
a program under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) designed to relieve
pressure on the balance of payments. This is to be achieved through a program
of public investment, especially in the energy and transport sectors. When the
program is presented to the Executive Board of the IMF, it is reported by the
Fund staff that the World Bank fully endorses the structural changes envisaged
under the program. No difficulty arises in this case because World Bank endorsement of the structural changes in question antedates the EFF negotiations with
the Fund, so that those negotiations are not held up in any way. The question
raised by this case is what would happen (a) if World Bank approval has not
been given at the appropriate time, and (b) if the World Bank has denied its
approval.
Case 2
A petition for an industrial sector loan for Country B is examined in the
Bank's loan committee with the endorsement of the regional department of the
Fund. However, the loan is not granted because of the Fund's disapproval of
the economic policy pursued by Country B, especially in the sector of
exchange rate policy and trade restrictions policy. The loan finally is not
granted because Country B fails to conform its policies to the IMF's desires on
this point.
Case 3
Drawings on an Extended Fund Facility loan by Country C are suspended
by the Fund because the member country fails to confine its economic policy
to the standardized performance requirements of the Fund's arrangement. This
leads to the World Bank's withdrawing its money from Country C by suspending
the second drawing on a Structural Adjustment Loan, and subsequently, to the
suspension of a rescheduling operation by the Paris Club.
Case 4
A World Bank loan for the backup of agricultural policies of Country D is
denied because the Fund does not reach an agreement with Country D on a
stand-by arrangement. Country D does not accept the Fund's "admonitions" or
certain aspects of its exchange rate policy. In this case the Fund has exercised a
de facto and not de jure veto on the World Bank's lending operations.

11. S. Dell, supra note 6.
FALL 1989
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Case 5
A World Bank loan to finance emergency imports for Country E to replenish
its severely depleted stocks of certain essential items is denied because Country
E does not reach an agreement with the Fund on a program of adjustment.
Case 6
The staff of the World Bank has reached the conclusion that Country F has
adopted an economic program that is consideied in accordance with the World
Bank's criteria as sufficient to justify a Structural Adjustment Loan. The Fund,
on the other hand, puts forward some difficulties in considering whether the
country's economic policies are appropriate enough so as to be entitled to make
use of the Fund's resources. The Fund urges Country F to adopt stricter policies
in its exchange rate policy program. The World Bank loan is denied. Finally,
Country F accepts the Fund's "admonitions," implements more stringent policies
and reaches an agreement under a stand-by arrangement. The World Bank loan
immediately is approved and released.
Case 7
In this case, the World Bank staff manages to convince the Fund staff that its
"admonitions" were unnecessarily severe, and the Fund staff agrees to ease the
conditions accordingly.
Case 8
A Fund-supported program in Country X includes specific measures for a
liberalization of import restrictions. A Bank industrial and trade policy loan to the
same country, negotiated soon after the arrangement with the Fund, demands a
reduction of import duties to a lower level than the effective rate of protection.
The revenue implications of this measure are inconsistent with the budgetary
targets in the Fund-supported program. Consultations with the Fund result in a
modification of those targets so that the country is able to conclude an agreement
with the Bank in accordance with its program measures. But the Bank's measures
are designed to obtain an exchange rate that is different from the one implied in
the Fund-supported program. Since this program has already been negotiated, the
Bank amends its program to conform to the Fund's exchange rate targets.
B.

THE NATURE OF "INFORMAL"

CROss-CNDITIONALrY

The crux of the issue is to be detected through the role that a stand-by or
similar arrangement
plays in the lending procedure with the World Bank. Richard
12
Edwards states:
On a few occasions the World Bank has conditioned its lending on the conclusion by
the borrower of a stand-by or Extended Arrangement with the IMF. When this has been
the case, the condition was usually satisfied before the loan was approved by the
Executive Directors of the bank, and thus, no specific covenant appeared in the loan or
guarantee agreement.
12. R.

EDWARDS, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION
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Thus, a stand-by or similar arrangement does not act as a condition in the loan
agreement but as a precondition. No specific clause has to be included in the loan
or guarantee agreement. The same analogy can be found in the preconditions set
by the Fund. 13 The preconditions laid down by a Fund mission must be executed
before an agreement is presented for approval by the Executive Board.
The issue that arises is whether the World Bank is entitled to demand, as a
precondition for access to its resources, an economic program supported and
approved by the Fund under a stand-by arrangement scheme and vice versa. 1 4 In
other words, does the Bank's right to demand an IMF stand-by or similar
arrangement as a precondition for the grant of a loan derive from an intra vires
power, or does it constitute an act ultra vires to its Articles of Agreement? The
same issue must be considered for the case where the Bank's approval of a
request acts as a precondition for the release of the Fund's resources.' 5 (Case 1).
C.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

It is generally accepted that the doctrine of ultra vires applies in the context of
international organizations. That this doctrine applies also in our case is clear. 16
Let me take Case 1 and analyze whether the Fund staff acts ultra vires to its
Articles of Agreement. In the case of the IMF Ebere 0. Osieke states:
The fact which emerges from the foregoing examination is that it may be possible to
claim that the acts of an organ of the Fund are unconstitutional, on the grounds that the
Fund has no competence to deal with the questions dealt with by the organ, or that the
organ has acted in a manner contrary to the express provisions of the Articles of
Agreement. 17

13. See infra section III.A.2.
14. That is to say, whether the Fund is entitled to demand as a precondition for access to its
resources, a development program supported and approved by the bank under either a development
(project) loan or a structural adjustment loan.
15. See Gold, (... To Contribute Thereby To ... Development ... ): Aspects of the
Relations of the International Monetary Fund with Its Developing Members, 10 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 267, 292 (1979); see also Wohlmuth, IMF and World Bank Conditionality, 16 DEV.
& PEACE 43 (Autumn 1985).
16. For a general view of the doctrine of ultra vires, see D. CIOBANU, PRELIMINARY OBJEcTIONS:
RELATED TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED NATIONALS POLITICAL ORGANS (1975); C. LEBEN, LES
SANCTIONS PRIVATIVES DE DRorrs Ou DEQUALITE DANSLESORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES SP9CIALIStES
(1979); Cahier, La Nullit6 en droit international,76 REv. GtNRALE DROIT INT'L PUBLIC 645 (1972);
Jennings, Nullity and Effectiveness in InternationalLaw, in CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS ININTERNATIONAL LAW
64 (1965); Lauterpacht, The Legal Effect of IllegalActs of InternationalOrganizations, in CAMBRIDGE
ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 88 (1965); Morgenstern, Legality in InternationalOrganizations, 48

BRiT. Y.B. INT'LL. 241 (1976-77); Osieke, Admission to Membershipin InternationalOrganizations:
The Case of Namibia, 51 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 189, 220 (1980); Osieke, The Legal Validity of Ultra
Vires Decisions ofInternationalOrganizations, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 239 (1983) [hereinafter Osieke,
Legal Validity]; Osieke, Ultra Vires' Acts in InternationalOrganizations-TheExperience of the InternationalLabour Organization,48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 259 (1976-77); Osieke, UnconstitutionalActs in
InternationalOrganisations:The Law and Practiceof the ICAO, 28 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 1 (1979).
17. Ebere 0. Osieke, The Constitutional Character of International Organizations with Particular
Reference to the I.L.O., I.C.A.O. and IMF (April 1974) (London University Ph.D. thesis unpublished).
FALL 1989
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In Case I the Bank's approval acts as a precondition for the Fund's
acquiescence in a member's petition for a drawing. The possibility arises for the
member to challenge the demand and to refuse to comply with informal
cross-conditional clauses on the ground that this act is ultra vires to the Fund's
Articles of Agreement. The doctrine of ultra vires could be applied at this stage
because the Fund's demand constitutes a "Decision" of the Fund.' 8 It is also an
act of an organ of the Fund; in our case, the organ could be either the Managing
Director or the Executive Directors. 19
In general, if a precondition emanates from the wrong organ or the manner
in which it is formulated is contrary to the express provisions of the Articles
of Agreement, then the matter has to be submitted to the Executive Directors
or the Board of Governors for a decision, or a request may be made to an
organ of the Fund for an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of
Justice. 20

18. Unambiguously, preconditions are "binding" decisions of the Fund, imposed on the
member, through the doctrine of estoppel, through the general principle of good faith, and on the
basis of a binding unilateral declaration. For the doctrine of estoppel see generally, B. CHENG,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW ch. 5; D.W, GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 34-38, 452 (2d ed. 1976); 1
G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed.); MacGibbon, Estoppel in InternationalLaw, 7
INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 468 (1958). For the theory of binding unilateral declaration, see Nuclear Tests
Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 267 (Judgment of Dec. 20); Carbone, Promise in InternationalLaw:
A Confirmation of its Binding Force, I ITAL. Y.B. INT'L L. 166 (1975); Frank, Word Made Law: The
Decision of the ICJ in the Nuclear Test Cases, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 612 (1975); Rubin, The
InternationalLegal Effects of Unilateral Declarations, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1977); Sicault, Du
Caractre Obligatoire Des Engagements Unilateraux En Droit International Public, 83 REV.
GtNtRALE DROIT INT'L PUBLIC 634 (1979).
19. See Ebere 0. Osieke, supra note 17. He states, inter alia:
A claim that the Managing Director or the Executive Directors have acted in a manner
contrary to the express provisions of the Articles of Agreement will, if disputed by the
organs concerned, amount to a question of interpretation between the member
concerned and the Fund. In such a case the claim will be decided by the Executive
Directors in accordance with the provisions of article XVIII, and their decision may
be appealed against to the Board of Governors ....
If the claim does not amount to
a question of interpretation, it may be made to the organs concerned in the first
instance, but may also be submitted to a superior organ for decision. This means that
a claim that acts adopted by the Managing Director are unconstitutional may be
submitted to the Executive Directors for decision, and a claim that the acts of the
Executive Directors are unconstitutional may be submitted to the Board of Governors
for decision.
20. See Agreement Between the U.N. and the IMF, art. VIII (1947); see also Ebere 0. Osieke,
supra note 17. He states:
[I]t may be possible to claim that the acts of an organ of the Fund are unconstitutional,
on the grounds that the Fund has no competence to deal with the question dealt with
by the organ, or that the organ has acted in a manner contrary to the express provisions
of the Articles of Agreement.
....
Any member may ask the organs of the Fund to submit a request to the
International Court of Justice for an Advisory Opinion as to whether the acts
complained of are valid. However, the organs are not under an obligation to submit
such a request, and even if they do so, they are not under an obligation to accept the
opinion given by the court.
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The precondition is set by the Fund, particularly by the Managing Director,
who is, essentially, involved with the formulation of preconditions. Despite the
fact that the precondition emanates primarily from the Managing Director,
however, it is the Executive Board that is the decision-making organ ultimately
responsible for the preconditions. The formal nature of the preconditions arises
in two ways. First, the Executive Directors, and therefore the Board, as a
superior organ to the Managing Director, have a decisive say in the matter of the
preconditions, at the "prerecommendation" stage. Second, when the Managing
Director recommends a member's request to the Executive Board, the Executive
Board, in approving the request, "makes" the precondition in a retrospective
sense with its formal seal of approval of a decision, although the precondition is
not included in the loan agreement. The Executive Board has notice of the
preconditions and it is the organ that decides on the matter; the Managing
Director is merely an instrument, a delegate of the Board, in this respect. Thus,
the precondition in our case is a decision of the Executive Board, directed at the
requesting member.
D.

THE PERSPECTIVE

1. The IMF
The question of ultra vires is one of interpretation. Gold has asserted that the
Fund has implied authority to interpret its own decisions, derived from its
express authority to interpret the Articles of Agreement. 2 1 Therefore, the matter
could be raised, in the first instance, with the Executive Board, with the
possibility of appeal to the Board of Governors. The decision of the Board of
Governors is final.22
The application of the doctrine of ultra vires to the Fund is quite limited. The
objectives and policies that are included either in a Letter of Intent or in a
stand-by document are primarily derived from the economic background. The
Fund, thus, has a considerable latitude in its operations.
The "balance of payments problems" in article V involve not just a balance
of payments disequilibrium per se, but also other "equilibrium objectives" of an
economic character, such as inflation, unemployment, trade restriction, etc. 23
Performance criteria, for instance, do not relate strictly to a balance of payments
21. J. GOLD, THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE FUND'S STAND-BY ARRANGEMENTS AND WHY IT MATTERS
40 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 35, 1980).
22. Articles of Agreement, art. XXIX; see also Osieke, Legal Validity, supra note 16, at 239.
23. A particular example is the prohibition of restrictions on trade, increasingly formulated as a
performance criterion. The inclusion of this prohibition as a performance criterion constitutes an
intrusion in the economic field of activity not strictly supervised by the Fund but rather under GAIT.
See J. Gold, supra note 21, at 10. Nevertheless, it constitutes an "equilibrium objective," and it
aims at the furtherance of the purposes of the Fund as stated in art. I. Furthermore, the Executive
Directors have called upon the members to collaborate with the Fund in avoiding the escalation of
restrictions on trade. See Decision No. 4134-(74/4), 1974; Decision No. 4232-(74/67).
FALL 1989
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disequilibrium, stricto sensu, but are connected more with equilibrium objectives. Some of these performance criteria are general obligations, expressly
imposed by the Articles of Agreement. 24 On the other hand, there are
performance criteria that are not expressly stated in the Articles of Agreement,
but are, simply, implied by these Articles. Thus, the measure of their propriety
and, subsequently, the measure of validity of the application of the doctrine of
ultra vires in this context, will not depend on an examination of the balance of
payments objectives, but will be regulated through other generally confined
considerations implied and concluded in the Articles of Agreement.
The Fund is directed, through its law, to conduct operations based on its aim,
as has been stated in article I. The purposes incorporated in this article are of
wide scope. They embrace a variety of economic objectives and are all subject
to a number of interpretations. The International Court of Justice Decision in the
Expense Case, 25 applied in this context, supports the argument that any action
taken in order to fulfill one of the stated purposes in article I, even indirectly,
cannot be considered as an ultra vires act to the Articles of Agreement.
Furthermore, article I is neither exhaustive nor exclusive. The Fund, in
formulating its policies under article V, has to take into account the provisions of
the Articles of Agreement generally. 26 Thus it becomes evident that the Fund, in
order to fulfill the purposes set out in article I, can consider a very large range
of economic objectives to formulate its policies. In light of this reasoning, it
seems quite difficult to argue that the Fund in Case 1 acts ultra vires to the
Articles of Agreement. As long as there is a balance of payments problem and
the objectives and policies are orientated towards the alleviation of this,
objectives found in the Articles of Agreement, or implied by them, may be
considered.
Thus, the Articles of Agreement do provide a basis for action for objectives
such as curbing inflation or development, even if they do not fall into the sphere
of the payments situation of the member. As long as there is a balance of
payments problem and the program is orientated towards this problem, these
lateral objectives either in the form of a precondition or in the form of a
performance criterion, are justified on the grounds that they constitute decisive
factors for the success of the economic program. Thus, the precondition in our
case can be contemplated as an intra vires act of the Fund, as long as it is
subordinate to the main object.
The other argument supporting the view that the ultra vires doctrine has a
limited scope of operation in practice is based on article X of the Fund's Articles

24. For instance, restrictions on payments for current transactions under the Fund's Articles of
Agreement, art. VIII, sec. 2.
25. Expense Case, 1962 I.C.J. 168.
26. For instance, the Fund's Articles of Agreement, art. IV, sec. I, invites the member state to
consider objectives and policies of a panoramic scope.
VOL. 23, NO. 3
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of Agreement. Article V, section 8, of the World Bank's Articles of Agreement
contains identical wording directing each agency to "cooperate within the terms
of the Agreement with any general international organization and with public
international organizations having specialized responsibilities in related fields."
A final reason, which reduces the possibility of the doctrine of ultra vires
being applied in Case 1, is the argument given by Henry Schermers. He states,
in the context of the World Bank:
An organization entering into an agreement which violates its constitution would act
ultra vires. In the case of the Bank, however, a presumption of validity may be made
as the organ competent to interpret its constitution (the E.D.) must approve all loan
agreements. Approval of the agreement implied the interpretation that the constitution
is not violated. 27
In the case of the IMF, the Executive Board is the organ that decides whether
or not to grant the request. It is also the organ responsible for "any question of
interpretation of the Articles of Agreement' '--subject to an appeal to the Board
of Governors. 28 Thus, the ultra vires doctrine could, ultimately, be rejected on
the above reasoning.
2. The World Bank
The Commonwealth report "Towards a New Bretton Woods ' 29 argued that
the important distinction between the World Bank as a development agency and the
IMF as a provider of short- and medium-term balance of payments finance should not
be allowed to obscure the fact that the policies cannot readily be compartmentalized30
into those serving the process of adjustment as distinct from those promoting growth.
to assume a joint responsibility for
It recognized the need for "both institutions
31
the relevant adjustment programs."
In the case of a Structural Adjustment Loan from the Bank, two aspects are
central to the point under examination. The first is the unwritten convention that
says that, before a country approaches the Bank, it has to have previously entered
into a stand-by arrangement with the Fund. The second aspect explains the first
and constitutes the rationale upon which one could argue that the precondition in
Case 3 must not be considered as an ultra vires act to the Bank's Articles of
Agreement. The rationale is that the close coordination between these two
institutions was produced by the nature of the policy reform areas that constitute
the main concern of the Bank's programs. Of the first dozen Structural
Adjustment Loans supported by the Bank, several were explicitly directed

27. 2 H. SCHERMERS,

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW

896 (1972).

28. The Fund's Articles of Agreement, art. XXIX.
29. Commonwealth Study Group, Towards a New Bretton Woods: Challenge for the World
Financial and Trading System (unpublished report), (study group headed by Prof. Gerry Helleiner of
the University of Toronto, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1983).
30. Id. para. 4.53.
31. Id. para. 4.56.
FALL 1989
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towards balance of payments policy issues, including debt management (eight),
import policy (four), export policy (ten), and the exchange rate (two). A concern
for better public sector management led to a direct involvement with budgetary
questions (seven cases) and monetary policy/interest rates (five), and thus with
an area that traditionally was subordinate to the Fund's control.
In other words, development and growth as goals, included in article I of the
Bank's Articles of Agreement, involve not just development problems, but also
broader areas of "equilibrium objectives" 32 that are necessary for the success of
an economic program. Moreover, the Bank is guided in all its policies and
decisions by the purposes set out in article I. These purposes contain a large area
of objectives that do not fall necessarily into the sphere of development objectives
per se, and these objectives are subject to various interpretations. Article I is not
an exclusive list of the Bank's objectives and policies. Furthermore, the Bank in
formulating its policies must have regard to the provisions of the Articles of
Agreement generally. 33 The Bank's Articles of Agreement impose a host of
considerations upon a Member State that it has to take into account in formulating
its policies.
Thus, it is evident that the Bank possesses a whole breadth of economic
objectives for which it can formulate policies. In Case 3, in light of the above
reasoning, it is difficult to maintain an argument of ultra vires. The precondition
of a stand-by arrangement from the Fund acts as a lateral economic objective that
is unambiguously consonant with the development purposes set in article I. The
precondition does not fall directly into the sphere of a development program, but
it could be contemplated as subordinate to the main object of development. In
addition, the difficulty, in practice, in isolating and identifying with precision
objectives and policies, in apportioning their contribution or lack of contribution
to the development purposes, poses severe difficulties for legal argumentation.
The fact that the precondition is interpreted as a corrective measure aimed at
the balance of payments problem does not alter the validity of the argument. A
stand-by arrangement with the Fund is considered as a necessary corrective
measure to enable the member to adopt and carry out its program under a
Structural Adjustment Loan. This precondition may be motivated not so much as
to enable the implementation of the program as a whole under a Structural
Adjustment Loan, but rather to assure the successful implementation of the
program. The precondition acts as an adequate safeguard to prevent the improper
use of the Bank's resources. A stand-by arrangement does not prevent the
implementation of a program under a Structural Adjustment Loan; on the
contrary, it facilitates the implementation. Nothing in the Bank's Articles of
Agreement suggests the impropriety of the application of this type of precondi32. E.g., inflation, trade restriction, balanced growth of international trade, maintenance of
equilibrium in the external payments.
33. See, e.g., The Bank's Articles of Agreement, art. II, sec. 1.
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tion. A letter of development policies, which is equivalent to a Letter of Intent,
contains references to corrective measures that are similar to those found in the
Letter of Intent.34 Thus, the precondition constitutes an extension of World Bank
conditionality and could be regarded as a weak type of World Bank conditionality. The member country's chances of invalidating an act of the Bank on the
ground that it is ultra vires to the Articles of Agreement seems to be quite
limited.
III. Legal Issues Arising from "Informal"
Cross-Conditionality-The Doctrine of Estoppel
Since the doctrine of ultra vires is of no great importance in the context of
preconditions, the legal character of preconditions-whether they constitute
"binding decisions'--requires investigation, since informal cross-conditional
clauses are in frequent use.
It is clear that in order to have access to the Bank's resources under a Structural
Adjustment Loan, the member country has to have submitted a "Letter of
Development Policies" in which it describes
the economic program it will
35
pursue. Richard Edwards, states, inter alia:
The World Bank and the Fund, although they cooperate, apply their own criteria in
appraising requests for assistance. On occasion the World Bank has indicated its desire
that a prospective borrowing country accept the self-imposed discipline associated with
an IMF stand-by or extended arrangement. On other occasions, without requiring an
IMF arrangement, the World Bank has borrowed the Fund's technique of requiring a
Letter of Intent, stating economic policies from the country's Finance Minister.
The Letter of Development Policies, which is similar to the Letter of Intent,
submitted by the member country to the Fund, is explicitly referred to in the loan
agreement. In this letter, the specific economic development policies to be
pursued are spelled out in detail.36 That the member country has to initiate the
procedure for a loan from the Bank is clear. The first stage of the negotiation for
a loan agreement is the preliminary talks that have to be undertaken on the
initiative of the government requesting a drawing. These talks will be followed
by the submission of an official letter, which spells out the willingness of the
member to implement an economic development program in order to qualify as

34. See generally M. GUmAN, FUND CONomONALrrY: EVOLUrION OF PRINCIPLES AND PRACtICES
(IMF Pamphlet Series); Adjustment and Growth: How the Fund and Bank are Responding to Current
Difficulties, FIN. & DEv., June 20, 1983, at 13; Rice, Maintaining Financingfor Adjustment and
Development, FN. & DEv., Dec. 20, 1983, at 44; see also A Role of the IMF in Economic
Development, BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO Q. R., Dec. 1982; Managing DirectorRelated Fund's

Long-Term Goals to Development Strategy, 8 IMF SURV. 117, 125 (Apr. 23, 1979) [hereinafter
Managing Director].
35.

R. EDWARDS, supra note 12.

36. E. Stem, World Bank Financing of Structural Adjustment, in IMF
(J. Williamson ed. 1983).
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a potential candidate for a Structural Adjustment Loan. 37 The member country in
this letter describes the economic development policies it wishes to pursue in
order to overcome the structural problems facing its economy. The development
policies need not be stated in chronological order, and do not need to be in a
single document. The development policies need only to be identified.
Thus, the Letter of Development Policies may contain a number of paragraphs
that deal with the past state of the economy, development problems facing the
economy, the development objectives of the government, and the special circumstances leading up to the request.
The Letter of Development Policies, forwarded by the member state, requesting
a drawing under a Structural Adjustment Loan, has to be scrutinized by the
Bank and given a response, either positive or negative, by the Executive
Directors, the appropriate organ for the approval of a request. The approval of
the request and the grant of the loan take the form of a loan agreement, which is
universally considered as an international contractual agreement. The participating members have full international juridical personality and they have not
only the capacity but also the intention to be bound by certain legal relations
between them.
The Letter of Development Policies betrays a more formalized nature in
comparison with the Letter of Intent in the case of the Fund. This letter leads to
a loan agreement. The Letter of Intent leads to a stand-by arrangement that is not
considered either by the beneficiary or the issuer as a contractual agreement.
Thus, the Letter of Development Policies could be construed as an offer on the
part of the member country to the Bank, and the loan agreement as a counteroffer or as an acceptance on the part of the Bank. The offer is contained in the
Letter of Development Policies and the acceptance is contained in the loan
agreement.
The member country requesting a Structural Adjustment Loan offers to the
Bank an economic development program that indicates a willingness to comply
on the part of the requesting country with the "core obligations" adopted by the
Bank. The Bank approves the request and grants the loan in the form of an
agreement that indicates the willingness of the Bank to accept the conditions
undertaken by the member.
This mechanism bears a striking similarity to an exchange of notes. That the
loan agreement could be construed as a type of international agreement that takes
the form of an exchange of notes is an argument that can be supported. 38 The
crux of the analysis concerns not the legal character of the loan agreement, but
37. A. Bredimas, Aspects Igales des Banques Internationales de Development, (Ph.D. thesis,
University of Paris, Sorbonne, Faculty of Laws, Paris 1, 1978).
38. That the "Exchange of Notes" constitutes international agreement, there is no doubt. See
R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 257 (1963); see also Meyer, The Names and Scope of Treaties, 51, AM. J. INT'L L. 574, 590

(1957).
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the legal character of the Letter of Development Policies signed by the requesting
country and forwarded to the Bank for consideration.
A.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

1. The Letter of Development Policies
The Letter of Development Policies undoubtedly contains undertakings that
could be considered as noncontractual. Nevertheless, in the context of the
agreement as a whole, and in the context of the mechanics of an exchange of
notes, the undertakings, even if they do not exhibit promissory language, could
be regarded as contractual.
By submitting a request for a Structural Adjustment Loan, the member
unhesitatingly indicates an intention to be bound, because the request leads to the
approval of the Structural Adjustment Loan, which is contemplated as a
contractual agreement. Thus, there is no apparent negotiation on the part of the
member of an intention to contract. Its willingness to enter into a contractual
agreement with the Bank is apparent in its demand for a loan.39
It could be argued, in other words, that the conditionality contained in the
Letter of Development Policies becomes binding either because it is part of a
bilateral agreement or because it is accepted unilaterally by the member country
concerned. This letter constitutes a declaration of the member country on the
proposed policies to be pursued. It has a quite important role because it initiates
an arrangement that is unanimously regarded as an international contractual
agreement. The letter, even if it does not refer explicitly to any contractual
undertakings, exhibits an intention to be bound under the conditions of a loan
agreement. The member makes an offer that is contained in the letter. The offer
is a fact that starts the procedure for a loan. The initiative is taken by the country,
and the request is made by the member, as contained in the letter. The Bank
cannot initiate a contractual agreement by a unilateral
decision. The member
40
must make the request and the Bank agree to it.
Thus, there is a request for a loan, an intention of the member to enter into a
contractual agreement with the Bank. This intention is concluded from the
general tenor of the letter. The Letter of Development Policies could be
contemplated as a unilateral statement of the member to be bound under the
terms of a loan accorded by the Bank.
The loan is certainly a contractual agreement. It comes (a) in response to the
member's willingness to be bound under this agreement and to make use of the
Bank's resources (offer) and (b) in response to the Bank's willingness (acceptance) to approve the use of its resources on the basis of this unilateral statement

39. V. VAN THEMAAT, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 123 (1981).
40. 1. DETrER, LAW MAKING BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 176 (1965); E. Stem, supra note

36, at 99.
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of intention. We have here an offer and an acceptance. The acceptance leads to
a contractual agreement between two entities with full international juridical
personality, and this agreement is produced by the exchange of signatures and
documents that, normally, constitute and evidence a contractual agreement in
international law.
Two points must be made here. The first is that the Letter of Development
Policies constitutes a unilateral declaration of intent, which is produced through
tough negotiations between the member country and the Bank staff mission.
Thus, it could be contemplated as a negotiated arrangement in which the
important elements of the preformulated arrangement (the loan) have been
agreed. The second point is that this unilateral declaration of intention is
explicitly referred to in the loan agreement. The loan agreement is a contractual
agreement requiring approval under the country's law. The member country is
under a legal obligation to pursue the policies set forth in the loan agreement and
indirectly in the Letter of Development Policies that is referred to in the bilateral
agreement (the loan). The member's failure to do so could be construed as a
breach of an international agreement.
For the above-mentioned reasons, it could be argued that the Letter of
Development Policies constitutes a unilateral declaration of intent with a binding
or quasi-binding character. The letter exhibits an intention of the member to be
bound under the terms of a bilateral agreement. This intention is illustrated in the
undertakings contained in the letter. The loan agreement makes explicit reference
to the letter and to the undertakings, even if they are not characterized as
qualified, promissory, or contractual. Further, the member's negation of an
intention to contract upon the materials in the letter, if it can be discerned at all,
does not prove that the member does not have any requisite intention to make a
binding unilateral declaration.
Thus there is an apparent intention on the part of the government requesting
a Structural Adjustment Loan, to be bound upon the terms of the letter. The
letter, consequently, constitutes a unilateral statement of intention with a binding
or quasi-binding legal character. The question that is still unanswered is whether
the precondition is a binding clause for the member country and what is the legal
character of this obligation.
2. The Characterof the Precondition
The Letter of Development Policies submitted to the Bank contains policies
and objectives, proposed by the member, in order to persuade the Bank that it
wishes to comply with the core obligations demanded for a Structural Adjustment Loan Agreement. This letter unambiguously contains economic measures
that could also be demanded by the Fund in a stand-by arrangement. Balance of
payments problems are part of development problems. Any measures aiming at
the solution of balance of payments problems undoubtedly pave the way for
appropriate investment programs. Thus, the reason why some officials claim that
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a "grey conditionality" zone has been created in the framework of IMF-World
Bank cooperation does not seem groundless. 41 While demand management and
financial stability have been the primary objectives of Fund policies, these factors
constitute the sine qua non for a potential development program. 42 A stand-by
arrangement for the Fund, even if it does not contribute directly to the
longer-term objectives of development of the member country concerned,
unambiguously enables the member to plan its development policies with greater
confidence. 43
The Letter of Development Policies forwarded by the member country to the
Bank refers to the economic measures the member is "persuaded" to take in
order to be entitled to a drawing under a Structural Adjustment Loan. These
measures overlap in some parts with the measures that could be taken under a
stand-by arrangement, stabilization program. The member, if it wants to influence the decision of the Bank in favor of its application, may imply or may
explicitly state that it intends to implement, or has already implemented, an
economic program supported by the Fund under a stand-by or extended
arrangement scheme. The question that arises is whether this undertaking
constitutes an obligatory undertaking, or whether it could be considered as a
moral obligation only. In other words, does the precondition in Case 3
constitute an undertaking for a member, with the same degree of enforceability
that any other undertaking included in the Letter of Development Policies may
have, or is it simply a wish of the member that a stand-by arrangement may be
implemented, an indication of its willingness to comply with the Bank's
"admonitions"?
The Bank expects the precondition to be implemented if the member wishes
to make a drawing under a Structural Adjustment Loan. The member is entitled to
refuse to comply with the Bank's instructions by signifying its unwillingness to
proceed with the request. The Bank's expectation is contingent upon the
member's making a request for a Structural Adjustment Loan. If the member, by
signifying its unwillingness to proceed with the request, withdraws its application, no expectation will arise on the part of the Bank. If the grounds upon which
the member is questioning the precondition are legitimate, then again it is
entitled not to implement the precondition. If, however, a member wishes to
proceed with the request, lodges a request, and yet refuses to implement the
preconditions for no apparent reason, the question arises whether the Bank is
obliged to consider the request de novo.
In this case, the issue is rather academic, because the Bank is entitled to
challenge the member's request as being inconsistent with the Articles of
41. Corrado Pirzio-Biroli, at 126, 145-51.
42. Guitian, Fund Conditionalityand the InternationalAdjustment Process, FIN. & DEV., June
18, 1981, at 14.
43. Gold, supra note 15, at 292.
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Agreement. Specifically, the Bank is entitled to challenge the request on the
ground that the precondition was imposed in accordance with article I of its
Articles of Agreement. If the Bank does not examine the application carefully so
as to be consistent with the provisions of the Articles of Agreement, it will have
contravened the provisions of article I by failing to ensure that the use of its
resources is proper and fulfills the purposes for which it was established; it will
have acted ultra vires to the Articles of Agreement.
Thus, the member has two options: either to accept the precondition and
proceed with the request, or to reject the precondition and withdraw its
application. Once the request is withdrawn or declined, the wish on the part of
the Bank to see the precondition implemented becomes inoperative. Furthermore, this type of precondition does not fall, stricto sensu, into the ambit of the
Bank's conditionality. The question arises whether the precondition is devoid of
any binding character or whether it could be considered a binding obligation that
stems from some other source of enforceability in international law.
Let me examine the first option, in which the precondition is explicitly referred
to in the Letter of Development Policies. We have seen that this letter could be
construed as a unilateral statement of intention with binding or quasi-binding
character. 44 The Letter of Development Policies suggests an intent to be bound.
First of all, it is addressed to the Bank for a loan agreement. The Bank's
intention to contract, through a loan agreement, is apparent. The Bank through
this bilateral agreement (the loan) wishes the member to undertake obligations to
observe the objectives and policy stated in the Letter of Development Policies
and this letter is referred to, explicitly, in the loan agreement. The Bank responds
to this letter with a loan agreement that is a contractual agreement in international
law; the Bank's "acceptance" of the "offer," which is in the letter, takes the
form of an international contractual agreement. The intention of the Bank to
contract is apparent. The letter leads to an agreement. Thus the intention of the
member to contract is given. 45 The member's willingness to implement the
stabilization program under a stand-by arrangement scheme, however, cannot be
considered as an undertaking with the same degree of enforceability that other
undertakings included in the Letter of Development Policies may have.
Thus, even if it could be argued that the precondition is binding in the context
of a unilateral binding declaration, 6 this argument does not sufficiently meet this
point. The member's "obligation" to implement the precondition must be
grounded on other sources or general principles of international law. It could be
grounded on the general principle of good faith. A refusal of the member country
requesting a Structural Adjustment Loan to implement a stabilization
44. Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J 267 (Judgment of Dec. 20).
45. Id.; Sicault, supra note 18, at 665.
46. See generally Carbone, supra note 18, at 166; Frank, supra note 18, at 612.

VOL. 23, NO. 3.

CROSS-CONDITIONALITY PHENOMENON

669

program supported by a stand-by arrangement from the Fund would constitute
bad faith.
Nothing in the Bank's Articles of Agreement, per se, excludes the imposition
of the precondition. Nothing could characterize the imposition of this type of
precondition as improper. On the contrary, article V, paragraph 8(b), requires the
Bank to "give consideration" to the views and recommendations of the Fund,
although it cannot be deduced that the Bank is bound by anything the Fund may
say or do.
The precondition, in our case, aims at the correction of the balance of
payments problem. This precondition is expected to be adopted in advance,
before the request appears for approval by the Executive Directors of the Bank.
The Bank mission is convinced that the precondition is necessary to enable the
member to adopt and carry out an economic development program supported by
a Structural Adjustment Loan. The precondition is not generally incorporated in
the Letter of Development Policies or in the loan agreement. In few, if any, cases
is the precondition explicitly stated as a specific condition in the loan covenant.
Sometimes the precondition is incorporated in the Letter of Development
Policies, but in the majority of cases the intention of the member to implement
the precondition is simply implied by the general tenor of the letter.
The precondition, if it is incorporated in the Letter of Development Policies,
cannot be considered as an actual undertaking, in the context of a unilateral
binding or quasi-binding statement of intention for the following reasons:
(a) The member's intention to implement a stabilization program supported by
a stand-by or similar arrangement from the Fund is merely a descriptive
expression of a course of conduct. It cannot be contemplated as a promissory,
binding obligation. Given the circumstances in which the intention is tendered,
however, particularly the fact that it is addressed "bilaterally'--specifically to
another entity-means that it is not devoid of consequences. First, there is an
obligation that the intention stated is actually contemplated at the time of its
being expressed and that there are reasonable grounds for holding that
intention. 47 If this were not the case, then the state concerned would be
considered to be tendering a misrepresentation. This could amount to a breach of
an obligation of good faith.
(b) The precondition does not fall, stricto sensu, into the ambit of the Bank's
conditionality. The Bank is not authorized to initiate binding norms divorced
from the use of its resources. This type of precondition cannot be contemplated
as aiming at the proper use of the Bank's resources. It cannot be considered an
undertaking derived from the binding or quasi-binding character of the unilateral
statement of intent. Thus, the member country's failure to implement the
47. See, e.g., Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, [1885] 29 Ch. D. 459, 483, Eng. (C.A., Bowen L.J.)
("the state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion").
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precondition could constitute only bad faith and therefore breach of the general
duty by the country to act in good faith.4 s
A subject of international law-in our case a member country requesting a
loan from the Bank-that communicates its intent to others is bound to accept the
legal implications of such a unilateral act; if it does otherwise, it breaks the rule
on the binding character of communicated unilateral acts. 49 The second point that
has to be scrutinized is the case where the precondition is not included in the
Letter of Development Policies. In this case, the member country is "obliged"
to implement the precondition on the ground of its general duty to act in good
faith.
A stand-by or similar arrangement is considered by the Bank as a necessary
measure for the successful implementation of an economic development
program support by the Bank under a Structural Adjustment Lending. Recent
practice has shown that the intensified collaboration between the Fund and the
Bank has already produced effects. In Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ivory
Coast, Ecuador, Ghana, India, Madagascar, Turkey, Uruguay, Zaire, and in
many other countries, Fund stand-by or extended arrangements were followed
by World Bank Structural Adjustment Loans. 5 0 The Fund is not a development
institution. The Extended Fund Facility and the long-term maturity credits
disbursed recently by the IMF could, however, be characterized as development
credits.5 1
The Bank's expectation that the member will implement a stabilization
program, supported by the Fund under a stand-by or similar arrangement
scheme, arises with the request for a Structural Adjustment Loan. In this
request, the member indicates how it intends to conduct its development
policies in the future. The statements, incorporated in the Letter of
Development Policies, must betray the frank intention of the member to
undertake a sufficient economic program in order to overcome its structural
deficit problems. The member country concerned has an obligation to tender
frank intentions regarding measures that have to be taken. The measures that
fall into the ambit of the precondition, as is contemplated in Case 3, must
constitute the essential background for the success of the development program.
The member's obligation to accept the precondition and proceed to its
implementation is grounded on its intention to overcome its economic
problems. The precondition formulates the background against which the grant
is to be made. Any deviation from the intention of the member to solve its

48. See B. CHENG, supra note 18; 1 G.

SCHWARZENBERGER,

supra note 18 (see index under

estoppel).
49. Schwarzenberger, The FundamentalPrinciplesof InternationalLaw, 87

312 (1955).
50. See IMF SuRv. 166 (Feb. 6, 1986) (June 2, 1986).
51. See M.

MILivOJEViC, THE DEBT RESCHEDULING PROCESS.
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economic problem could be regarded as inconsistent with the general duty in
international law to act in good faith. The country, thus, is estopped from acting
otherwise.
IV. "Formal" Cross-Conditionality
A.

THE EXTENT AND THE NATURE OF "FORMAL"

CROSS-CONDrIONALrrY

Informal cross-conditionality is the rule rather than the exception. In practice,
the formal veto is a rare phenomenon. In the majority of cases, one of the Bretton
Woods institutions succeeds in preventing or delaying a loan without any formal
action being taken, or any formal veto being imposed.
As far as I know, only one case involving such an explicitly stated formal
veto has come before either of the Executive Boards. In this case, the
respective Executive Board decided that the loan had to be held up until
compliance and implementation of the requisite cross-condition had been
secured. Thus, in a very overt way the respective Executive Board is made
officially aware of the existence of a cross-condition and its decision is made
upon this event. In this there is a specific condition in the loan agreement of the
Bank, tying the grant of a Structural Adjustment Loan to the implementation of
a stabilization program supported by the Fund under a stand-by or similar
arrangement.
The crux of this phenomenon is based on the legal sense of the term "tying"
used in the loan covenant. The term "tying" must be the legal link that
constitutes an agreement with the Fund, the sine qua non contemplated as a
material legal condition for the grant of a Structural Adjustment Loan.
Formal cross-conditionality has three preconditions:
(a) The first condition is that the decision, or generally the consideration of the
request for the grant of a Structural Adjustment Loan, has to be made by the
Executive Board of the Bank when officially aware of the existence of such a
"cross-insurance clause."
(b) The second condition is that the clause has to be incorporated in the loan
agreement in a formal way so as to act as a "tying cog" between the provision
and the execution of the main agreement.
(c) The third condition is that the provision must explicitly refer to the
conclusion of an agreement between the government requesting a Structural
Adjustment Loan and the Fund under a "lending" scheme through a stand-by
or similar arrangement. In the case of no such condition explicitly referring to
the conclusion of such an agreement, but simply mentioning the necessity of an
endorsement by the Fund of the structural changes envisaged under a Structural
Adjustment Loan program, then there is no formal cross-conditionality.
The third point could be supported by the argument that direct "formal"
cross-conditional clauses in international banking law presuppose the existence
of two agreements, which both grant a request for loans. In the event that the
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provision does not, explicitly, specify any such "borrowing" arrangement from
the Fund, then this could be classified as indirect "formal" cross-conditionality.
Sidney Dell in his definition includes this case as an explicit form of "formal"52
cross-conditionality without specifying whether it is a direct or an indirect form.
In my opinion, this does not constitute a direct "formal" cross-conditionality. It
could be contemplated as indirect "formal" cross-conditionality, because a
formal understanding or a formal decision that incorporates the clause of the
concurrence/endorsement of the other Bretton Woods institution as a sine qua
non is not similar to the case where the member is subject to a formal veto over
a loan against a drawing by the other or over a drawing against an existing
loan.
Thus, as far as "formal" cross-conditionality is concerned, we can discern
two forms. The first form contains the formal legal tie in which the Bank relies
on the Fund's approval of a stand-by similar arrangement and vice versa. The
second form contains the formal legal tie in which the Bank relies on the Fund's
concurrence/endorsement of the structural changes envisaged under an economic
program supported by a Bank program loan and vice versa. The first form,
unambiguously, could be nominated as direct "formal" cross-conditionality.
The second form could be termed as indirect "formal" cross-conditionality. In
both cases, the expressed conditions could be envisaged as cross-default
provisions, similar to those operating in international private banking law. If we
accept this argument, axiomatically we will not reject the point that direct
"formal" cross-conditionality cited from the World Bank's approach operates
only in sub-case 1 and not in both sub-cases; and that indirect "formal"
cross-conditionality cited from the IMF's approach operates only in sub-case 2.
This point needs further scrutiny.
A direct "formal" cross-conditionality enables one Bretton Woods institution
to impose a "formal" veto over a loan against a drawing or over a drawing
against a loan. This, cited from the World Bank's approach, could be interpreted
as a "formal" veto over a loan against a drawing from the Fund (Case 3). The
other way around, that is to say, direct "formal" cross-conditionality, cited from
the Fund's approach, cannot be accepted because in cases of this form, the
formal veto is imposed by the Fund's Executive Board over a drawing against an
endorsement/concurrence of the Bank, upon the structural changes envisaged
under the program supported usually by an Extended Fund Facility (Case 1).
Even in the case of a formal veto imposed by the Fund, it cannot be contemplated
as a direct "formal" cross-conditionality, because the cross-default provisions
do not refer to "borrowing" arrangements from both Bretton Woods institutions.
Thus, direct "formal" cross-conditionality can be cited from the World Bank's
approach only; indirect "formal" cross-conditionality can be cited from the
52. S. Dell, supra note 6.
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Bank or from the Fund. This argument could be supported by the fact that
towards an ambitious
balance of payments disequilibrium is the first step
53
development program and not the other way around.
B.

THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF FORMAL CROss-CoNDMONALrrY

Gold accepts that "formal" cross-conditionality is not only improper
but also
55
nonexistent. 54 The same point is reiterated by Stephen Silard.
Let me elaborate on this point. In Case 1, if the member fails to comply with
the "admonitions" of the Decision, so as to obtain the approval of the Bank, it
breaches a contractual agreement. This act does not characterize the member as
a lawbreaker in international law, however, for the following reasons:
(a) The member is not "obliged" to comply with the precondition incorporated in a stand-by or similar arrangement.
(b) This breach does not constitute a breach of an international agreement. The
stand-by or similar arrangement is considered by the writer as an international
contractual agreement of adhesion. The member, thus, is not a lawbreaker, but
is a breaker of Fund law and an international personality acting in bad faith.
The same argument could be applied in the case of an indirect "formal"
cross-conditionality cited from the World Bank's approach. In this case,
however, the member acts not only in bad faith, but also commits a breach of an
international agreement, because it does not comply with a specific provision
incorporated in the loan covenant, which umambiguously constitutes an international contractual agreement. Thus, the member here is apparently a lawbreaker in international law, because the specific clause acting as a crosscondition has a binding, normative, obligatory sense. The member undertakes,
through the loan agreement, an actual, specifically stated, obligation and if it
does not comply with this obligation it is a lawbreaker in international law.
Apart from the theoretical point of view, however, this case has not occurred
in practice as far as I know although I will not be surprised by such a
phenomenon, operating in current financial transactions. What is left now is the
phenomenon of direct "formal" cross-conditionality arising from the World
Bank's approach.

53. The Criticalbut Elusive Relationship Between Adjustment and Economic Growth, 14 FiN. &
DEv. 7 (1977); Hino, IMF-World Bank Collaboration, FN. & DEV., Sept. 23, 1986, at 10; Managing
Director. supra note 34; Mookerjee, Financial Stability and Planning, FiN. & DEV., Mar. 9, 1972,
at 2; Silard, The Role of the International Monetary Fund, 32, AM. U.L.R. 100 (1982-83);
Stabilization and World Bank, 12 WORLD DEV. 165 (Feb. 1984); Towards a New Bretton Woods: The
Grey Area Between Development and Balance of Payments Finance, 18 COMMONWEALTH EcONOMIC
PAPERS
228.

54.
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In the case of a loan agreement with Jamaica, approved December 13, 1977,56
there was a specific covenant in the loan agreement tying the World Bank's
disbursement to the ability of Jamaica to purchase stated amounts under stand-by
arrangements with the IMF. 57 In this case, the condition is specifically stated as
an explicit provision in the loan agreement, and the cross-default clause acts as
a legal tie between the Bank's loan and the member's willingness to draw from
the Fund under a stand-by arrangement. This case betrays the intention of the
Bank to impose a formal veto over a loan against a drawing from the Bank.
Apparently, this case constitutes a direct "formal" cross-conditionality, and the
member, if it does not follow the provisions of the agreement, is considered a
lawbreaker in international law.
Nevertheless, the following argument could be raised at this juncture. The
term "cross-conditionality" is of relatively recent vintage. It is quite possible
that in 1977 there had not yet been any such pronouncement. The General
Counsel to the Bank thus ought to have pointed out to the President and the
Executive Board that while the World Bank is required "to give consideration"
to the views and recommendations of the IMF, the Bank is not authorized to
surrender the power of decision on the use of its resources to any other
institution. Tying World Bank disbursements to compliance by Jamaica with a
stand-by arrangement with the IMF would appear to constitute a surrender of the
power of decision. Thus, in this case, it would seem that the Bank has acted ultra
vires to its Articles of Agreement, especially article V(8)(b).
V. Conclusion
In conclusion, although the Interim and Development Committees have made
clear that cross-conditionality, however one defines this term, has been persistently avoided in the financial transactions by both institutions, there is evidence
that there are cases where "informal" cross-conditionality has occurred in the
sense of a veto by one of the Bretton Woods institutions over a loan by the other.
Rarely has a case of "formal" cross-conditionality reached the Executive Board
of either institution. On the other hand, there appear to have been many cases of
"informal" cross-conditionality where each of the Bretton Woods institutions
has withheld loans to a member country or has suspended a borrower's access to
an existing loan, without any formal decision being taken or any formal veto
58
being cast.

56. See supra note 10.
57. Edwards, An IMF Stand-by Arrangement, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L LAW & POL. 521 (1984-85);
T. HAYTER, AID, RHEtORIC AND REALITY 49.

58. See Proceedingsof the Standing Committee on ForeignAffairs: Senate of Canada, Seventh
Proceedingson Canada'sParticipationin the InternationalFinancialSystem and Institutions, issue
No. 8, at 0.8:16 (Apr. 15, 1985) (testimony by Mexican Finance Minister):
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Direct "formal" cross-conditionality falls into the ambit of international law,
whereas direct "informal" cross-conditionality falls into the ambit of general
principles of international law. In the case of direct "formal" cross-conditionality
the member is considered as a lawbreaker in international law if it does not follow
strictly the provisions of the loan covenant. In the case of direct "informal"
cross-conditionality, the member is considered an international personality acting
in bad faith. Direct "formal" cross-conditionality is visible in the Bank's approach only. Indirect "formal" cross-conditionality is evident in both institutions'
approaches. Indirect "informal" cross-conditionality is the regular practice from
the collaboration between the two Bretton Woods institutions.

The World Bank is establishing a new set of conditionality rules. Now, we have
conditionality by the IMF, conditionality by the World Bank, and the process goes on.
The bilateral agencies are also establishing their own conditionality. So after a while
you end up with so many rules of conditionality and cross-conditionality that you give
the government no leeway to decide a proper adjustment policy well adapted to their
internal needs.
See also Federman, The IMF and World Bank: Small Change for the Third World, Soum,
Nov. 1980; Hodd, Africa, the IMF and the World Bank, 86 AFR. AFF. J. ROYAL AFR. Soc. 331
(July 1987); Outtara, Role of the (InternationalMonetary) Fund in Africa, IMF Sutv. (June
1, 1987); Stewart, Equipping the Fund and the Bankfor the Long Haul, BrKaR, Sept. 1985;
Wohlmuth, IMF and World Bank StructuralAdjustment Policies: Cooperation or Conflict?,
5 INTERECON. 226 (Sept-Oct. 1982); Wohlmuth, supra note 15, at 33; World Bank and IMF
Loan Policies to Africa, 9 Moo. AFR. 3 (1985).
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